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AbstrAct
The meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which was 
held in December 1991 and attended by the foreign ministers of NATO member 
states, former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Baltic States 
was a prelude to enlargement. Although the direct threat of an attack in the terri-
tories of NATO countries had ceased to exist, armed conflict in the border areas 
of NATO – especially in the former Yugoslavia – emerged as new threats. The 
NATO cooperation programme Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched on the 
initiative of the US in 1994 and was tasked with preparing the military structures 
of potential new member states.
Even before the adoption of the new Constitution, Chairman of the Supreme 
Council of Estonia Ülo Nugis declared in October 1991 that Estonia’s goal was 
to join NATO as soon as possible. Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner 
visited Estonia in March 1992. However, the main task of the Estonian defence 
policy until 1994 was the withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of 
 Estonia.
The fundamentals of the Estonian defence policy passed in the Riigikogu in 
May 1996 stated that the goal of the policy was to join NATO and WEU.
In 1994, Estonian soldiers took part in NATO/PfP training (Cooperative 
Spirit 94) for the first time. In 1995 Estonia joined the NATO Planning and 
Review Programme. Estonia has been taking part in NATO peacekeeping mis-
sions, initially as part of the Danish battalion, since 1995.
The idea of Estonia becoming a member of NATO seemed utopic at the 
time the country’s independence was restored, but it had already become a seri-
ous possibility by the mid-’90s. The events in Europe and around the world, 
the openness of NATO and Estonia’s own determination and efforts helped to 
achieve this.
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Guaranteeing the security of the state became one of the main issues that 
the young, restored Republic of Estonia had to start dealing with from 
day one. It soon became clear that guaranteeing security with the state’s 
own means alone was impossible and Estonia had to join the structures 
that ensure the security of Europe. NATO became the obvious choice. 
Although NATO membership seemed relatively utopic in a country that 
had just broken free from the shackles of the Soviet Union, it managed to 
achieve this goal a mere decade later, in 2004.
This article focuses on the first years after independence was regained 
(1991–1995/1996), when the foundations of Estonia’s movement towards 
NATO membership were laid. The development of the NATO-related 
thought in Estonia, the first stages of the cooperation between Estonia 
and NATO, various types of international cooperation and the domes-
tic activities aimed at supporting Estonia’s integration with NATO will be 
discussed.
The general context of NATO enlargement  
and partnerships in the early 1990s
Period of self-searching in NAtO
The collapse of the Soviet empire opened a completely new era in Europe’s 
security. 
At the Rome summit of the 8th of November 1991, NATO declared 
that the Cold War had ended and adopted a new strategic concept, which 
called for a broader approach to security where cooperation and dialogue 
would hold the key roles. The organisation decided to establish a new 
political relationship with countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
As a follow-up to the decisions made in Rome, a new cooperation 
forum called the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was estab-
lished at the meeting of foreign ministers of NATO and the former East-
ern Bloc countries held on the 20th of December 1991 in Brussels. The 
initial members of the forum were NATO member states, former Warsaw 
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Pact member states and the Baltic states. The NACC was established at 
the same time when the Soviet Union was taking its last breaths. In the 
course of the meeting the Soviet ambassador announced that its coun-
try had ceased to exist and he was representing the Russian Federation 
instead.1 The NACC became a forum of multilateral political consulta-
tions on security issues that were topical at the time, such as the vari-
ous regional conflicts on the ruins of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet 
Union.
However, the end of the Cold War was also an existential issue for 
NATO itself. The disappearance of the former enemy raised the ques-
tion of the role of the Alliance in the changed situation. The bloodshed 
in former Yugoslavia, which soon required the intervention of NATO 
itself, indicated that whilst any direct military threat to the territories of 
NATO member states may have disappeared, the instability on the Alli-
ance’s borders and beyond had become a growing security threat. NATO’s 
enlargement to the east became a part of the question of how to advance 
security and stability in the entire Euro-Atlantic region.
the emergence of the issue of NAtO’s enlargement  
and the birth of PfP
The topic of enlargement itself became a serious item on the Alliance’s 
agenda in 1993. Under the political pressure applied by the so-called 
Visegrad Group2 countries of Central Europe, the Allies were forced to 
start formulating their positions and the approach to the question of how 
to react to the desire of the former Eastern Bloc countries to become 
members of NATO. At first, there was no common understanding in 
NATO about whether the Eastern Enlargement would be beneficial for 
the Alliance. Supporters emphasised the benefits that the new members 
would bring to the Alliance; sceptics in their turn pointed out the prob-
1 North Atlantic Coordination Council (NACC), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/top-
ics_69344.htm (accessed 9.2.2014).
2 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
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lems that the enlargement would cause in relations with Russia as well as 
in the functioning of NATO itself with a larger number of members.
Although the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, had signed a decla-
ration during his visit of Poland on the 25th of August 1993, basically 
expressing his consent for the potential NATO membership of Poland,3 he 
soon changed this position. The representatives of Russia started to con-
stantly describe the negative consequences of NATO’s enlargement and 
threatened to take counteraction. Russia’s anti-NATO rhetoric became 
the background that accompanied the Alliance’s enlargement delibera-
tions throughout their various stages.
In 1993, President Clinton’s administration in the US was following 
the so-called ‘Russia first’ principle, adopted after the collapse of the Soviet 
empire, in its foreign policy and Washington was therefore not ready to 
advocate the enlargement. However, it was clear that something had to be 
done, because the purely consultative NACC was basically nothing more 
than a talking shop and didn’t meet anyone’s expectations any longer. 
This is why the United States came up with the idea of the new coopera-
tion programme called Partnership for Peace (PfP) in autumn 1993. This 
programme would, instead of enlargement, focus on the development of 
practical cooperation between NATO and non-member states.
The PfP programme was officially launched at the NATO summit 
held in Brussels from the 10th–11th of January 1994. The PfP was a kind 
of a compromise between the two sides: firstly those who wanted to avoid 
aggravating Russia at any cost and secondly those who were in favour 
of the enlargement. Within the context of enlargement, the programme 
primarily served two purposes for NATO: firstly, it had to bide its time 
before making any decisions about enlargement and secondly, it was 
actually necessary to start preparations for future enlargement to guaran-
tee that new members could join the Alliance and especially its military 
structures as smoothly as possible.
3 Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO´s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 
37–40.
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Meeting of NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe General 
Sir Brian Kenny and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Estonia Arnold 
Rüütel in Kadriorg Palace (25th of February 1992). From the left: Foreign  
Minister Lennart Meri and Arnold Rüütel; Brian Kenny, 2nd from the right. 
Erik Prozes/author’s private collection
Whilst the NACC was a political forum created solely for the purpose 
of the post-Cold War European security environment and contained no 
bilateral cooperation programmes between NATO and partner states, the 
PfP was already a tool that could be used for practical cooperation and 
allowed the partner states to take steps towards NATO membership. The 
programme made it possible to proceed to direct defence and military 
cooperation with the Alliance. The future members could familiarise 
themselves with the way NATO functions via PfP planning, joint train-
ing and other activities. On the other hand, participation in the PfP pro-
cess was supposed to help the partner states reorganise their post-Soviet 
armed forces to make them comply with the models developed in demo-
cratic countries. The PfP gave no guarantees that full membership of the 
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organisation would be offered, but it was a good opportunity to prepare 
for this.
Several Central and Eastern European countries had hoped that 
NATO membership would be granted to them by expedited procedure 
at the Brussels summit, and although these hopes did not come true, the 
Alliance reassured them that NATO’s doors would remain open for new 
members. President Clinton explained that when it came to the enlarge-
ment, the questions were “when” and “how” and not whether it would 
take place at all.4 
Gradual emergence of NATO membership  
as Estonia´ s security policy option
Estonia’s first cautious steps towards NATO 
The first contacts and attempts at cooperation between Estonia and 
NATO started almost immediately after the restoration of independence 
in August 1991.
The first Estonian politician to raise the need for NATO membership 
was Chairman of the Supreme Council Ülo Nugis. Having returned to Tal-
linn from the Madrid meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly on 24 Octo-
ber 1991, where Estonia was granted the status of observer by this inter-
parliamentary organisation of the NATO member states, Nugis declared 
at the press conference that “Estonia should try to become a member of 
NATO as soon as possible“5. This objective seemed utopic at the time and 
was purely an expression of Nugis’s personal opinion. However, the ice had 
been broken and on the 17th of November 1991, Päevaleht published the 
article “Estonia should join NATO” by history student Vahur Made, where 
this idea was backed up by convincing arguments for the first time.6
4 Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (New York: Random House, 2002), 111.
5 Toomas H. Liiv, “Ülo Nugis: Eesti peab saama NATO liikmeks niipea kui võimalik,” Päev-
aleht, 25.10.1991, 1.
6 Vahur Made, “Eesti peaks ühinema NATOga,” Päevaleht, 17.11.1991, 3.
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NATO membership became a possible security policy choice for Esto-
nia. However, some other concepts were also popular in the first years 
after the restoration of independence. The most widespread one of them 
was to remain neutral like Finland and Sweden.7 It can be assumed that 
the continued presence of the Russian troops made its own mark on peo-
ple’s way of thinking and, moreover, on the courage of expression: there 
were fears that putting too much emphasis on the NATO card would give 
the Russians an excuse to delay the withdrawal of its troops.
However, Estonia was definitely interested in the establishment of 
contacts and cooperation with NATO. Foreign Minister Lennart Meri 
was the first member of the Estonian government who officially visited 
the NATO headquarters on the 12th of November 1991. He met with the 
Secretary General Manfred Wörner and spoke to the ambassadors of the 
member states in the North Atlantic Council (NAC). When the NACC 
was established on the 20th of December in the same year, Estonia was 
naturally one of its founding members. Relations with NATO developed 
within the framework of the NACC at first. The representatives of Esto-
nia started taking part in seminars and meetings, and mutual familiarisa-
tion visits were organised for both politicians and military staff members. 
Ambassador Clyde Kull, who was also the Ambassador of Estonia to the 
Kingdom of Belgium and the Permanent Representative to the European 
Union, was accredited the Permanent Representative of Estonia to NATO 
in December 1991.
The first high-ranking NATO officer who visited Estonia was General 
Sir Brian Kenny, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Deputy 
SACEUR), who came over on the 25th of February 1992. This visit was 
soon followed by the first visit of the Secretary General of NATO to Esto-
nia: Manfred Wörner was in Tallinn from the 14th–15th of March 1992. 
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee General Vigleik Eide visited 
Estonia in October 1992. The warships of NATO member states started 
port visits to Tallinn – these visits had a symbolic meaning for Estonia 
that still had foreign troops in its territory. The visit of eight ships and 
7 An overview of the discussions of security and defence policy trends at the time is given by 
Hellar Lill in “Eesti riigikaitsepoliitika kujunemisest,” Akadeemia nr 9 (2009): 1741–1748.
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1,300 seamen of the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFOR-
LANT) in the beginning of August 1992, which lasted for several days, 
was particularly impressive.
The representatives of Estonia in their turn started paying frequent 
visits to NATO headquarters. The commanders of the defence forces of 
the three Baltic states visited the NATO Brussels headquarters and the 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons in July 
1992 by invitation of the NATO Military Committee. Chief of the Gen-
eral Staff of the Defence Forces Colonel Ants Laaneots represented Esto-
nia. Lennart Meri visited the headquarters again on the 25th of Novem-
ber 1992 in his new capacity as the President of the Republic of Estonia. 
The NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where Estonia had been an associate 
member since May 1992, also became an important forum for explaining 
Estonia’s opinions and aspirations.
The main objective of Estonia’s security policy until 1994 was to 
achieve the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory. This is why 
one of the main issues raised at the time in all contacts with NATO was 
the Alliance’s possible assistance in making the foreign troops leave. 
However, the work done to achieve the withdrawal of the Russian troops 
was channelled into other organisations and formats, and NATO never 
really played a role in this.
The questions of practical defence assistance raised by Estonia in con-
tacts with NATO included the need of the newly re-established defence 
force for various training and material support as well as expert assis-
tance. Again, the NATO of those days didn’t turn out to be the suitable 
format for this. However, the Alliance did encourage Estonia to establish 
direct relationships with its member states, and assistance programmes of 
specific NATO countries soon followed.
All in all, the contacts between Estonia and NATO in the first years 
following the restoration of independence remained relatively superficial 
and on the level of political contacts, military diplomacy and information 
exchange. Both sides had their reasons for this.
The Estonian foreign and security policy authorities, especially the 
Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces, had no connections or expe-
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rience, and there was also a lack of people who spoke English as well as of 
money. When the first meeting of NATO defence ministers with partner 
states in the NACC format took place in April 1992, Estonia was repre-
sented by diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Estonia didn’t 
yet have a Ministry of Defence. The first Defence Minister Ülo Uluots 
admitted in his so-called political testament, which he left to his succes-
sor in the position of minister in autumn 1992, that “good contact with 
NATO has been established, but we cannot play along due to the lack of 
staff and money”.8
On the other hand, NATO itself wasn’t ready for closer relationships 
either. The Alliance still hadn’t developed a more specific framework for 
cooperation with the non-member states. As a result a deeper military 
cooperation with former Eastern Bloc countries was basically out of the 
question. NATO was interested in security and stability in the Baltic Sea 
region, and in Estonia and the other Baltic states continuing to exist as 
independent countries. At the same time, the West was generally still cau-
tious about the Baltic states, as it had no idea how these three would cope. 
Back then, the Baltic states were still seen as potential sources of conflict 
because of the presence of Russian troops, potential ethnic tensions, bor-
der disputes and a number of other reasons. For example, at the meeting 
with Ambassador Clyde Kull on the 15th of November 1992, Chairman 
of the NATO Military Committee General Vigleik Eide mentioned the 
situation in the Baltic States as a source of tension in Europe that was 
a concern for NATO in addition to the events in the Balkans and the 
situation in Russia9. The (unofficial) arms embargo implemented by the 
NATO member states as well as the Nordic countries on the Baltic states 
at the time was an expression of that fear.
The topic of NATO wasn’t really discussed during the Riigikogu and 
presidential elections of September 1992. However, discussions of NATO 
membership on the political level started in earnest after the formation 
of Prime Minister Mart Laar’s government in October 1992. The new 
8 Ülo Uluots, “Poliitiline testament,” 1992, KMA 1/18.
9 Memo of Ambassador Clyde Kull “Meeting with the Chairman of the NATO Military Com-
mittee General Eide, Summary”, Brussels 15.11.1992, copy in author’s possession.
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government immediately chose full integration with the West as its clear 
political direction and this also covered joining the security structures of 
Europe.10 NATO was seen as the only functioning security organisation 
that had the political and military means required to ensure the secu-
rity of Estonia against the resurgence of the Russian threat. Although this 
direction of Estonia’s security policy was not formally defined anywhere 
at the time, the country’s gradual movement towards NATO membership 
had started.
The topic of NATO still remained relatively distant for the Defence 
Forces and national defence on a broader scale. In March 1993, the Gov-
ernment submitted the document “Fundamentals of National Defence”, 
which had been prepared in the Ministry of Defence and constituted the 
first proposal to formulate a national defence concept, to the Riigikogu. 
The document declared: “Estonia will integrate into Europe and work 
with collective security systems that follow the principles of the UN 
(CSCE, possibly also NATO, WEU)”11. This is the only mention of NATO 
in the document and the topic of NATO was never raised during the dis-
cussions in the Riigikogu. In the end, the document itself fell victim to the 
political battle of those days and was never adopted by the Riigikogu or 
even properly discussed.
However, the need to develop the Defence Forces in accordance with 
the standards of NATO began to be mentioned, often without any real 
knowledge of what these standards were like. For example, the decision 
to transfer to NATO standards in regard to mutual procedures and topo-
graphic maps was adopted at the meeting of Baltic Defence Ministers in 
February 1993.12
In this context, the political decision to transfer to the use of arma-
ment corresponding to NATO standards in the Defence Forces, which 
10 Mart Laar, “Esimesed sammud NATO poole,” – Eesti NATO lugu 1991–2004, toim. Lauri 
Lindström, Henrik Praks (Tallinn: Eesti NATO Ühing, 2014), 64–69.
11 Draft of Riigikogu Resolution No O88 on the Development of National Defence Acts, RA 
2/27/1, 64.
12 Press release of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Defence Ministers on their 24 February 
1993 meeting in Tallinn, copy in author’s possession.
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was adopted by Mart Laar’s government immediately after it stepped into 
office, was significant. The result was the agreement for purchasing weap-
ons for the Defence Forces from Israel, which was signed in January 1993. 
The scope of the agreement was unprecedented under the circumstances 
and its price including interest payments amounted to US $60 million. 
Politically, the weapons deal was seen as a part of Estonia’s clear intent to 
break away from its dependence on the East. Prime Minister Laar com-
pared it to the introduction of the country’s own currency in term of stra-
tegic importance.13 As a result of the deal, the Defence Forces of Estonia 
were the first in Central and Eastern Europe that became equipped with 
weapons that used the same ammunition as NATO member states.
13 Verbatim report of the 2nd Session of the 7th Parliament, 19 April 1993, http://www.riigi-
kogu.ee/?op=steno&stcommand=stenogramm&date=735206400 (accessed 9.2.2014).
Supreme Allied Commander Europe General George A. Joulwan (in the 
middle) visiting Kalevi Infantry Battalion in Jägala, Estonia. On the right 
Commander of Defence Forces General Aleksander Einseln (22nd of 
September 1995). Albert Truuväärt/ETA/author’s private collection
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The appointment of Retired Colonel of the US Army Aleksander Ein-
seln as the Commander of the Defence Forces of Estonia by the Riigikogu 
on 4 May 1993 was another expression of the ideology of getting closer to 
the West and thereby also to NATO.
Estonia joins PfP and the political course  
towards NATO is set 
As NATO started discussing its enlargement options, Estonia started 
making clear declarations in the second half of 1993 that it wanted to 
become a member of the Alliance. At the meeting held in Tallinn on the 
15th of  December 1993, the Baltic presidents confirmed together that 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia see NATO as their main security guarantee 
in the future.14 The direction of NATO was not just the initiative of the 
President, Government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but an expres-
sion of a wider consensus in Estonian politics.
Estonia emphasised the importance of the European Union’s enlarge-
ment alongside the Eastern Enlargement of NATO from the very begin-
ning. It was understood that Estonia’s chances of NATO accession would 
improve via the success achieved in the direction of the European Union. 
In his interview to Päevaleht on the 26th of February 1994, Foreign Min-
ister Jüri Luik summed up Estonia’s approach as follows: “The main prob-
lem of our foreign policy is that we have to keep all of our options open: 
NATO, EU… No one can predict today when we’ll become members of 
the EU and NATO. It’s important that we’re prepared, that we’re open to 
these organisations. We don’t know when our chance will come”15.
When NATO announced its Partnership for Peace programme 
in January 1994, it created a lot of confusion at first. The launch of the 
PfP caused significant disappointment in the Visegrad Group, as it had 
14 Alo Kullamaa, “Balti presidendid näevad NATO-t peamise julgeolekugarantiina,” Päevaleht, 
16.12.1993, 1.
15 Toomas H. Liiv, “Jüri Luik: poliitika ja armastus on mõlemad hukutavad kired,” Pühapäev-
aleht, 26.2.1994, 2–3.
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been hoping for much clearer enlargement prospects. Estonia, however, 
was able to assess its options rationally. It greeted the launch of the pro-
gramme as a positive, concluding that this was the maximum it could 
get from NATO at the time. It was also important for Estonia that the 
candidate countries were not divided into groups and that the Bal-
tic states were therefore not separated from the Visegrad countries in 
the process.
On the 14th of January 1994, President Lennart Meri and Prime Min-
ister Mart Laar signed their joint letter to the Secretary General of NATO 
Manfred Wörner to confirm Estonia’s wish to join the PfP programme. 
Foreign Minister Jüri Luik signed the PfP framework document on behalf 
of Estonia at the ceremony held in Brussels on the 3rd of February 1994. 
Presidents of the Baltic 
States in BALTBAT 
headquarters in Ādaži, 
Latvia. President of 
Estonia Lennart Meri is 
hammering a nail in a 
flagpole of the training 
centre (8th of February 
1995). Lembit Michelson/
ETA/Estonian Film 
Archives
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Estonia was the fourth country to join the Partnership for Peace. In his 
address to the North Atlantic Council, Minister Luik declared that Esto-
nia had taken the first step towards full NATO membership.16 
The launch of the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994 opened 
a new, broader dimension to Estonia’s political and practical NATO inte-
gration efforts and to the related international cooperation. The depar-
ture of the Russian troops in August in the same year alongside the sta-
bilisation of the country’s internal security and economic situation also 
meant that Estonia started feeling more secure as a state and thereby also 
more confident in its aspirations.
The new government of Prime Minister Tiit Vähi that came to power 
after the Riigikogu elections in spring 1995 continued with the course 
towards NATO established by its predecessors. This policy was formally 
confirmed on the 7th of May 1996 when the Riigikogu unanimously 
approved “The Fundamentals of Estonian Defence Policy”, the first 
national defence policy concept of Estonia after it regained its indepen-
dence. This document stated expressly that “Estonia’s goal is to become 
a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and 
the Western European Union (WEU). Cooperation with their defence 
organisations is our main political and practical opportunity to develop 
and strengthen the security and national defence of Estonia”17.
Estonia’s NATO aspirations had gained strong support in political 
circles as well as in society as a whole. As the actual outlook of accession 
was still vague this didn’t mean that the relevant security debate had com-
pletely ended. Possible alternatives to NATO membership continued to 
be suggested, such as neutrality or perhaps a different organisation, e.g. a 
military union of the Baltic States.18 However, these alternatives failed to 
generate any in-depth political discussions. Estonia’s aim was set at NATO.
16 Address to the North Atlantic Council by H. E. Jüri Luik, Brussels, NATO, 3.2.1994, copy in 
author’s possession.
17 “Eesti riigi kaitsepoliitika põhisuunad,” RT I 1996, 33, 684, https://www.riigiteataja.ee/
akt/13009161 (accessed 27.6.2014).
18 Hellar Lill, “Eesti riigikaitsepoliitika sõnastamisest 1996–1999: Põhisuundadest NATO-
liikmesuse tegevuskavani,” KVÜÕA Toimetised 17 (2013), 91–96.
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NATO and the establishment  
of the Estonian national defence 
Unlike the European Union, NATO does not have any specific criteria 
for the selection and admission of new members. The enlargement of 
NATO is a political process and the Alliance wants to preserve its politi-
cal decision-making and freedom of operation whilst avoiding anything 
that’s automatic.
However, the Alliance prepared the NATO Enlargement Study in 
1995, which stipulated the principles of enlargement, i.e. the general 
conditions for why and how NATO should enlarge. According to the 
study, states that want to join NATO have to meet a number of various 
conditions. Adherence to the principles of democracy, free market and 
human rights is the main basis for enlargement. As NATO is a military 
alliance, then defence and military aspects are of particular importance. 
For example, the study emphasised that the capacity of future members to 
make military contributions to collective defence and the Alliance’s mis-
sions will be the factor that will determine whether they will be invited 
to join. In the practical sense, the countries had to harmonise the prin-
ciples of their defence planning and the civilian control of armed forces 
with those of NATO to ensure that their armed forces are interoperable 
with NATO nations, contribute sufficient resources to their integration 
into NATO and be able to participate in joint operations, incl. collective 
defence.19
The desire to join NATO gradually started influencing the wider 
defence policy choices of Estonia. In the beginning of the 1990s, there 
were still quite a number of people who believed that since Estonia would 
never be able to put up military resistance against a possible aggressor, 
then all we needed were police and border guard forces. However, it now 
became clear that in order to become a member of NATO, Estonia had to 
have a defence capacity that NATO could count on. 
19 Study on NATO Enlargement, 3.9.1995, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_
texts_24733.htm (accessed 9.2.2014).
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In practice, this meant that the country had to develop its own mili-
tary capabilities and do it in a manner that would guarantee procedural 
and technical interoperability with NATO. The document “The Funda-
mentals of Estonian Defence Policy”, adopted in 1996, tried to answer 
these questions. It declared that national defence would be developed in 
two main directions that complement each other and are integrally con-
nected: independent defence that is based on national defence forces and 
international defence cooperation aimed at joint defence activities with 
European security and defence organisations.20
The size of the defence budget was another issue raised in relation to 
NATO accession. Estonia had to demonstrate to the NATO Allies that it 
was prepared to contribute to national defence. NATO’s general guideline 
to its member states is to allocate 2% of their GDP to national defence, 
but implementing this in Estonia initially remained at the level of wishful 
thinking. In reality, Estonia’s defence budget in the 1990s reached 1–1.2% 
of the GDP.21 National defence wasn’t yet a real priority for the govern-
ments of those days.
In building the defence forces with a view towards NATO accession, the 
state started developing international military cooperation in four closely 
related areas:
•	 participation	in	the	Partnership	for	Peace	programme	of	NATO;
•	 participation	 in	 international	 peacekeeping	 and	 crisis	manage-
ment;
•	 practical	defence	cooperation	with	other	Baltic	states;	and
•	 bilateral	defence	cooperation	with	different	Western	countries.
20 “Eesti riigi kaitsepoliitika põhisuunad,” RKo RT I (1996), 33, 684.
21 Eesti NATO lävepakul: 80-aastane Eesti Kaitsevägi = Estonia on the threshold of NATO: Esto-
nian Defence Forces 1918–1998, tõlge: Ilvi J. Cannon, toimetajad Lea Arme jt (Tallinn: Kait-
seministeerium, 1999), 15.
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Cooperation network within the scope  
of the Partnership for Peace programme
The PfP programme became the main driver of the practical coopera-
tion between Estonia and NATO. Estonia made a policy decision that its 
cooperation with NATO within the scope of the PfP should be seen as the 
tool that would help it achieve its ultimate goal – NATO membership. It 
was therefore important for the cooperation to be as close and diverse as 
possible. After the declaration of the programme, President Lennart Meri 
compared it poetically to a beautiful empty perfume bottle that had to be 
filled with content.22
The PfP individual cooperation programmes between NATO and the 
partner countries were set up bilaterally, which meant that the specific 
features of each country could be considered and the exact content of the 
cooperation programmes depended on each country’s own activity.
Participation in the PfP had various benefits for the security policy 
and national defence of Estonia:
•	 it	was	the	best	and	most	specific	tool	for	getting	closer	to	NATO	
and for cooperation with the defence structures of NATO and its 
member states that the Alliance offered at the time;
•	 it	provided	the	opportunity	to	learn	the	operating	logic	of	NATO	
troops, the so-called military English and terminology used in 
NATO as well as the standards and technical requirements of 
NATO;
•	 it	 offered	 the	 opportunity	 to	 build	Estonia’s	 defence	 forces	 and	
infrastructure in a manner that would allow for cooperation with 
NATO whenever necessary and for receiving military aid from 
abroad;
•	 it	 enabled	 Estonia	 to	 participate	 and	 have	 a	 say	 in	 global	 and	
European security processes, e.g. by participating in international 
peace missions;
•	 it	became	the	basis	for	constant	exchange	of	security	and	defence	
information with NATO.
22 Kullamaa, “Balti presidendid,” 1.
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Estonia’s participation in PfP had to be made as meaningful as possible in 
order to maximise the programme’s benefits for the development of the 
defence forces and its capabilities as well as achieving the interoperability 
with NATO and its member states.
The cooperation network within the scope of the PfP turned out to be 
diverse, primarily covering two areas – participation in the joint events 
of NATO/PfP, including military exercises and training; and the devel-
opment defence interoperability and bringing Estonia´s national defence 
planning procedures closer to those of NATO.
The first practical step in the development of cooperation was send-
ing a liaison officer to the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons. 
This cell was created for the coordination of cooperation and information 
exchange with partners. Estonia’s Liaison Officer Lieutenant Peeter Läns 
was sent over in April 1994, and he became the first representative of the 
Estonian Defence Forces to NATO.
In order to launch substantive cooperation, Estonia first had to sub-
mit the PfP Presentation Document, which contained its proposals and 
requests for cooperation. A workgroup consisting of the representatives 
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence and of the Defence Forces 
was formed for the preparation of this document. The document was 
completed in summer 1994 and in July, Ambassador Clyde Kull handed 
it over to NATO. Estonia announced that it was prepared to contribute to 
the Alliance activities by connecting one company of the Defence Forces 
with NATO. In return, Estonia hoped for financial support for the con-
struction of an airfield, port and training centre.23
The next step was the preparation of the Individual Partnership Pro-
gramme (IPP) between Estonia and NATO. NATO approved the first IPP 
of Estonia on the 1st of March 1995. It listed priority areas of cooperation 
and cooperation events with the Alliance in 20 areas of defence policy 
and military issues. The areas that Estonia underlined in the first IPP as 
those of most importance for itself were as follows: 1) airspace control; 
2) various exercises with supporting seminars and courses; 3) language 
23 Estonian PfP Presentation Document, draft, 30 June 1994, copy in author’s possession.
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training; 4) peacekeeping cooperation; 5) training in equipment and 
logistics; 6) development of civil-military cooperation.24
Participation in PfP events
Estonia tried to take part in as many PfP events (seminars, confer-
ences, training and exercises) as possible in light of its limited resources, 
both human and financial. In addition to the practical benefits, active 
participation was also politically important and was meant to dem-
onstrate Estonia’s will and readiness to join NATO. There was also an 
opportunity to gain experience from cooperation with troops of NATO 
Allies. The participation of Estonian servicemen in numerous field and 
command post exercises of NATO/PfP therefore became one of the 
main and most visible parts of the cooperation between Estonia and 
NATO.
The first NATO/PfP training exercise in which Estonian servicemen 
participated was the peacekeeping exercise Cooperative Spirit 94. An ad 
hoc platoon of 25 men, mainly officers and non-commissioned officers 
of the peacekeeping company, was created for the exercise.25 In 1995 the 
Defence Forces participated in about ten PfP-related training exercises, 
either with subunits or observers. This included sending an infantry 
platoon to the Cooperative Nugget peacekeeping exercise in Louisiana, 
United States. One of the main duties of the Estonian Navy that was re-
established in 1994 was to participate in the NATO/PfP naval training 
exercises. The first exercise Estonia took part in with a ship (EML Sulev) 
was BALTOPS ’95, an exercise organised by the US in the in June 1995. 
The participation of the Defence Forces in PfP events kept growing in 
subsequent years. In 1996, for example, they participated in 24 training 
exercises and 125 other events.26
24 Aruanne Eesti-NATO koostöö arengutest 1994–1998, undated, copy in author’s possession.
25 Sõdurileht, nr 1(12), January 1995, 5.
26 Estonian Annual National Programme 1999 (Tallinn, 1999), 31.
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Lack of money was an obstacle in the development of cooperation 
with NATO. The support of the United States of America has to be men-
tioned in this regard. The US provided significant amounts of fund-
ing to finance the participation of Estonian representatives in the PfP 
events. However, Estonia still had many expenses to cover and finding 
money for this was difficult in the beginning. For example, it became 
evident in the beginning of 1995 that although Estonia had joined the 
PfP programme and selected a number of events in which to participate, 
no money had been allocated for them in the state budget for 1995.27 
Non-participation would have not only meant falling behind in acquir-
ing NATO experience for the Defence Forces – Estonia’s reputation in 
NATO also depended on active participation in PfP events. The neces-
sary money had to be allocated from the government’s reserve fund. In 
order to avoid such embarrassing situations in the future, the budget of 
the Ministry of Defence had a separate line for PfP participation expenses 
from 1996.
National defence planning and the PfP Planning  
and Review Process (PARP)
In January 1995, NATO launched the Planning and Review Programme 
(PARP) which was aimed at developing the interoperability of the forces 
of partner states with NATO. This interoperability in its turn was a pre-
condition to becoming a full member. Also, PARP mechanisms were very 
similar to NATO’s own planning procedures. Therefore, the participa-
tion in PARP became the first actual step for the development of national 
defence in Estonia according to the standards of NATO. Within the scope 
of the PARP, Estonia also started submitting data about the situation and 
future plans of its Defence Forces as well as the conceptual objectives of 
national defence.
27 Letter of Defence Minister Enn Tupp to Commander of the Defence Forces Aleksander 
Einseln, no 01-22/555, 28.2.1995, copy in author’s possession.
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Estonia’s first PARP action plan prepared in cooperation with NATO 
was approved on the 25th of April 1995. Estonia chose 11 of the 25 
Interoperability Objectives initially suggested by the Alliance. These 
objectives covered both the units that had to be prepared for international 
missions as well as areas related to the development of national defence as 
a whole, such as the development of infrastructure and logistic support. 
These first 11 objectives represented a diverse set of various areas, such 
as the standardisation of fuel types and fuelling equipment according to 
NATO requirements, the standardisation of the frequencies of means 
of communication, the creation of English-speaking liaison groups, etc. 
Estonia decided to create a military unit the size of a company, which 
had to be prepared to participate in the missions and training exercises of 
NATO and able to operate as part of the NATO troops.28
Estonia’s problem back then was the shortage of people who could 
deal with aspects of NATO in the national defence system. The first coop-
eration programmes and documents of Estonia and NATO were prepared 
by a handful of officials and members of the Defence Forces and the Min-
istry of Defence, and the Defence Forces on a broader scale were still left 
out of the process. NATO-related work was done in the Defence Forces 
in addition to other functions and its importance tended to remain 
 secondary, as there was little faith that accession to NATO was actually a 
possibility.29
This is why the impact of NATO on defence planning in Estonia and 
the development of the structures of its Defence Forces remained rather 
limited at first. National defence was still developed on the principle that 
it was necessary to develop a fully independent defence capability. At the 
same time, planning had to be done in consideration of essential every-
day needs and the extreme limitation of resources. Also, NATO’s planners 
did not try to directly influence Estonia as a sovereign state in its deci-
sions and choices.
28 Interoperability Objectives – Estonia, Annex to PfP (PMSC)D(95)8, copy in author’s pos-
session.
29 Margus Kolga, “Rahupartnerlusprogrammist liikmesuse tegevuskavani,” – Eesti NATO lugu 
1991–2004, toim. Lauri Lindström, Henrik Praks (Tallinn: Eesti NATO Ühing, 2014), 82–89.
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However, there were exceptions too. The development of the Navy 
and Air Force that were re-established in 1994 was immediately and 
closely related to interoperability with and integration into NATO. The 
activities of these forces focussed largely on the international dimension 
and the creation of connections with the structures of NATO.
International peace missions, Baltic and broader  
international cooperation
Estonia declared that each PfP country also had to offer something to 
NATO instead of just benefitting from the partnership. It would have to 
produce security in addition to consuming it. This meant the capacity to 
contribute to regional and international security both independently and 
in cooperation with neighbour states. Participation in international peace 
missions became the main output of such contributions.
NATO itself was looking for a new ‘idea’ after the end of the Cold War 
and the disappearance of the former enemy, and peacekeeping and crisis 
management started becoming the areas on which the Alliance increas-
ingly focussed its attention. By taking part in international peacekeep-
ing missions, Estonia could demonstrate its capacity for playing a role in 
guaranteeing peace and security at the international level as well as the 
actual interoperability of its Defence Forces with the troops of NATO and 
other partner states.
The idea for the establishment of a joint peacekeeping unit of the 
Baltic states first appeared in 1993. Things became more specific at the 
meeting of the commanders of the defence forces of the Baltic states on 
the 19th of November 1993, where the decision to start the establish-
ment of the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) was made. The 
official foundation to this was laid on the 13th of September 1994 with 
a trilateral Baltic agreement about the establishment and formation of 
a joint peacekeeping unit. Although BALTBAT was formally created for 
participation in the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations, help-
ing the defence forces of the Baltic states get closer to NATO and thereby 
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supporting the general NATO integration were seen as the unit’s objective 
from the very beginning. Politically, BALTBAT was the clearest expres-
sion of the understanding of the Baltic states that they would have to 
contribute to international security. It was also aimed at showing NATO 
and the other partners that the three states are able to cooperate with each 
other. In practice, the battalion became the tool for channelling Western 
know-how, military culture, values and standards to the defence forces of 
the Baltic states.
BALTBAT was also of great interest for NATO and individual Allies. 
The UN peacekeeping umbrella above the battalion gave the Western 
nations the opportunity to give military aid without aggravating Russia. 
This is why BALTBAT became the first unit in the Baltic States that was 
fully equipped with Western weapons and trained according to Western 
standards. The Nordic countries, who were the traditional experts in 
peacekeeping, started supporting the project, and Denmark adopted the 
role of leading country in the process. In addition to the Nordic coun-
tries, leading NATO Allies, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
also provided significant support. Organisation of the general military 
training of the new battalion was assigned to the British marines. All 
of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the military unit were 
trained by them. This fact in itself demonstrated that the battalion’s goal 
was much bigger than the preparation of the traditional UN Blue Berets 
that remain strictly neutral in areas of conflict.30
Since the formation of the battalion started from zero, it all took time. 
This is why the soldiers of the Estonian contingent of BALTBAT were not 
the first members of the Estonian Defence Forces who took part in an 
international mission. Denmark had proposed back in 1994 that Estonia 
dispatch an infantry platoon to the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protec-
tion Force) in Croatia as part of the Danish battalion. The proposal was 
accepted and an infantry platoon called ESTPLA-1 was formed for the 
30 An overview of the birth of BALTBAT is given by Pete Ito in “Baltic Military Coopera-
tive Projects: a Record of Success,” – Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of 
Defence Development in the Baltic States, ed. by Tony Lawrence and Tomas Jermalavičius (Tal-
linn: International Centre for Defence Studies, 2013), 246–282.
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mission. All that the Estonian Defence Forces gave to the platoon were 
uniforms; all other equipment and weapons came from the Danes. After 
some short training, ESTPLA-1 headed to Croatia in February 1995 and 
the participation of the Defence Forces of Estonia in international opera-
tions had started. In the second half of the same year, they were replaced 
by the new platoon ESTPLA-2, whose mission ended early as the local sit-
uation changed and the UN mission was terminated. However, this only 
meant a very short break in Estonia’s peacekeeping activities. The end of 
the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in autumn 1995 resulted in the 
dispatch of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to the country. The 
successful cooperation with the Danish Defence Forces that had started 
in Croatia also continued in Bosnia. ESTPLA-3 was dispatched there in 
spring 1996, becoming the first sub-unit of the Estonian Defence Forces 
that took part in a mission commanded by NATO.31
BALTBAT did not remain the only initiative in the Baltic cooperation 
aimed at NATO. The cooperation between the three Baltic States gave the 
opportunities to join efforts for the achievement of results that would’ve 
been unattainable individually.
The next specific area where the issue of Baltic cooperation arose was 
air surveillance. The first goal was to establish a joint Baltic airspace sur-
veillance and control system in accordance with NATO standards. The 
existence of such an air surveillance system was seen as a precondition 
to NATO membership. In 1994 the Baltic air forces already started coop-
erating with the NATO Air Defence Committee (NADC). As this area 
is technologically very complicated and extremely expensive, the activi-
ties remained at the conceptual level at first. Things really started moving 
after the US suggested in 1995 that the Baltic States join the Regional Air-
space Initiative (RAI) developed by the Americans for Central European 
countries. The objective of the RAI was to develop air surveillance and 
31 An overview of the participation of Estonia and the other Baltic States in international 
peacekeeping missions is given by Piret Paljak in “Participation in International Military Oper-
ations,” – Apprenticeship, Partnership, Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the 
Baltic States, ed. by Tony Lawrence and Tomas Jermalavičius (Tallinn: International Centre for 
Defence Studies, 2013), 202–245.
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control systems compatible with NATO, which could be connected to the 
general air defence system of NATO in the future. The joint Baltic air 
surveillance system BALTNET grew out of this project in the subsequent 
years.
The joint Baltic Naval Squadron BALTRON and the Baltic Defence 
College in Tartu were added to the list of common Baltic defence coop-
eration projects in the second half of the 1990s.
All of these projects were carried out with the strong support and 
assistance of a number of Western states. The role of Denmark was par-
ticularly significant – from the very beginning, it became the strongest 
supporter and adviser of the NATO aspirations of the Baltic states. In 
Troops of the Baltic 
Peacekeeping Battalion 
(BALTBAT) on 
training in Paldiski, 
Estonia (1995). Tõnu 
Noorits/author’s 
private collection
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addition to the active political support provided by other NATO Allies, 
Denmark also started supporting the development of the Baltic defence 
forces and their becoming eligible for NATO membership on the initia-
tive of the Danish Defence Minister Hans Hækkerup. Denmark was the 
leading country in the BALTBAT project and oversaw the participation 
of the Baltic sub-units in international missions, played the key role in 
the launch of the Baltic Defence College, gave advice in PARP issues, etc.
In addition to the activities within the scope of the PfP, general bilat-
eral and multilateral international defence cooperation also supported 
Estonia’s NATO aspirations. The first bilateral defence framework agree-
ments were signed in 1994 with Denmark, Ukraine, France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom. By 1996, Estonia already had such agreements 
with 12 states. Practical defence cooperation was based on annual coop-
eration plans, which by 1996 had been signed with Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France and Poland. In addition, the activities of the 
Military Liaison Team of the National Guard of the State of Maryland, 
US, in Estonia were very active – 84 events were organised by this group 
in 1996 alone.32 Non-NATO countries, particularly Finland and Sweden, 
but also Switzerland, deserve a mention for their practical support as well.
One of the central areas of the bilateral defence cooperation was the 
organisation of training programmes for members of the Defence Forces. 
General advice on building the Defence Forces and the national defence 
system was also extremely valuable. For example, the group of retired 
high-ranking officers called the International Defence Advisory Board 
(IDAB), which was led by General Sir Garry Johnson, the former Com-
mander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Northern Europe, operated in this field. 
There was also significant material assistance from the Western nations, 
which at first didn’t include any weapons. However, Estonia also started 
receiving donations of arms from the second half of the 1990s.
32 Eesti kaitsejõud 1991–1996 = Estonian defence forces 1991–1996, väljaandjad Eesti Vabariigi 
Kaitseministeerium, Kaitsejõudude Peastaap (Tallinn: Kaitseministeerium, 1996), 21–22.
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Conclusion
Estonia had different options to consider in its security and defence 
policy after regaining its independence. The lesson taught by the events 
of 1939/1940 was that Estonia should never again find itself in the situ-
ation where the state has no allies and has to stand up against a formi-
dable enemy on its own. The logical choice in this light was to try and 
join NATO, the central defence organisation of the free and democratic 
Europe.
Achievement of NATO membership seemed utopic in the very first 
years after regaining independence. First of all, Estonia had to solve more 
urgent security issues, especially the achievement of the departure of 
Russian troops from the country. In national defence, NATO was mainly 
a background topic at first that didn’t have much impact on practical 
developments. The breakthrough arrived in 1994, when Estonia focussed 
firmly on NATO membership. At the same time, NATO itself started tak-
ing the first specific steps towards opening the organisation. These steps 
were rather timid at first and focussed on the establishment of partner-
ship relations within the scope of the Partnership for Peace programme. 
The PfP, however, gave the Estonian Defence Forces and national defence 
system as a whole the first chances to gain some real NATO experience. 
The North Atlantic Alliance was no longer terra incognita – Estonia 
started acquiring experience from the activities of NATO and the first 
plans for bringing Estonia closer to the Alliance were born. There was 
also the growing bilateral and multilateral international defence coopera-
tion network.
By the mid-1990s, the Republic of Estonia was in the situation where 
speaking about NATO membership didn’t necessarily sound like a fan-
tasy any more. This objective was also conceptually cemented with the 
document on the fundamentals of defence policy in 1996. Many years of 
growing and expanding efforts were yet to follow, but a foundation for 
Estonia’s NATO aspirations had been created.
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